This paper provides an exhaustive characterization of testability and identi…ability issues in the collective framework in the absence of price variation; it thus provides a theoretical underpinning for a number of empirical works that have been developped recently. We …rst provide a simple and general test of the Pareto e¢ ciency hypothesis, which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possible consumption externalities between household members, and all types of interdependent individual preferences and domestic production technology; moreover, the test is proved to be necessary and su¢ cient. We then provide a complete analysis of the identi…cation problem; we show under which assumptions it is possible to identify, from the observation of the household consumption of private goods, the allocation of these goods within the household as well as the Engel curves of individual household members.
Introduction
That a household comprising several adult members with speci…c preferences does not necessarily behave as a single rational agent should not be an object of debate. We know, at least since Arrow's famous impossibility theorem, that groups do not usually behave as individuals. Yet, for decades most theoretical and applied micro-economic work on household consumption, labor supply, savings or fertility behavior has been based on the assumption that indeed household decisions could be analyzed as stemming from a unique, well behaved utility function; this sometimes known as the unitary assumption.
The natural explanation for such a practice in the demand literature is that only household expenditures are usually observed. In general, there is practically no information on the way these expenditures are allocated among the various members of the household -possibly for public use -nor on the way that allocation may depend on aggregate savings or fertility decisions. The household thus appears as a black box which is conveniently modeled using the single rational agent hypothesis. It is quite revealing that the …rst attempts away from that practice were made on one hand in relation with the few cases where it was possible to observe the allocation of some good within the household or some consequences of that allocation, and on the other hand when endogenizing the formation (marriage) or the breakdown of households. The …rst 'bargaining' models of household behavior have thus developed in connection with models of joint labor supply within the household as well as divorce theory; see Manser and Brown (1980) , McElroy and Horney (1981) and Becker (1991) . Likewise, some literature has built up on the issue of food allocation within families in developing countries based on the observation that in some countries boys seem to be better nourished than girls; see Behrman (2000) for a review of this literature.
It remains that the unitary approach is questionable from a theoretical perspective. An additional problem is that it seems to be contradicted by the data. Perhaps the most convincing falsi…cation has been provided by the literature on 'distribution factors'. Distribution factors are de…ned as variables that can in ‡uence household behavior, if at all, only through their impact on the decision process; that is, they a¤ect neither preferences nor the budget constraint, and should thus be irrelevant in a unitary context. A …rst wave of models, starting with Thomas (1990) , Schultz (1990) , Bourguignon et al (1993) and Browning et al (1994) , test the 'income pooling'hypothesis, according to which, controlling for total household income, its distribution between members should not a¤ect behavior. All these papers reject the income pooling assumption.
A common concern raised by these models is that labor as well as non labor income may be endogenous, which could bias the results. For that reason, recent contributions have explored the impact of other, arguably more exogenous distribution factors. Thomas et al. (1997) , using an Indonesian survey, have shown that the distribution of wealth by gender at marriage has a signi…cant impact on children health in those areas where wealth remains under the contributor's control, even when current wealth and income were controlled for. 1 Du ‡o (1999) has derived similar conclusions from a careful analysis of a reform of the South African social pension program that extended the bene…ts to a large, previously not covered black population; she shows that the impact of this windfall gain on the health of children crucially depends on the gender of the recipient -a typical distribution factor 2 . Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) use the state of the marriage market, as proxied by the sex ratio by age, race and state, and the legislation on divorce as particular distribution factors to study household labor supply; they …nd that an environment more favorable to women is associated with a signi…cantly lower (resp. higher) level of female (resp. male) labor supply. In a similar context, Rubalcava and Thomas (2000) refer to the generosity of single parent bene…ts and reach identical conclusions.
Recognizing that households might not behave according to the single rational agent model does not mean that there cannot be any restriction on their aggregate consumption or joint labor supply behavior. Rationality may still be present under one form or another at the household level. The problem is precisely to know under what form. The research program in that area thus consists of investigating alternative hypothesis about decision making in the household and testing them against each other on the basis of the restrictions they may imply for the household demand and labor supply functions. If some of these hypotheses appear to hold against empirical evidence, it may be expected that the corresponding restrictions on household demand behavior will permit the identi…cation, at least partially, of the intra-household allocation mechanism and then the welfare of individual household members.
Various contributions have tried to introduce such alternative frameworks. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) have proposed models based on cooperative game theory and bargaining. A more general approach has been proposed by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , Bourguignon et al. (1993) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2001a) , who have developed a "collective" framework. In its most general version, the collective approach relies on the sole assumption that household decisions are Pareto e¢ cient; no additional requirement is made upon the choice of the particular outcome on the Pareto frontier as in the bargaining models. The obvious advantage of this approach is its generality; it is clear, for instance, that all previous bargaining approaches are nested within the collective framework.
The question, of course, is whether this approach is not simply too general; i.e., is it able to generate testable restrictions at all? Surprisingly enough, several contributions have shown that, indeed, the collective model, even in its most general version, could generate strong testable restrictions on observed behavior. Two families of tests can be distinguished, depending on whether price variations can be observed in the data. Tests based on price e¤ects have been …rst introduced by Chiappori (1992) in a very simple model of labor supply with two egotistic agents and no public good. He shows that the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption indeed imposes restrictions on joint labor supply functions. These conditions have been tested by Fortin and Lacroix (1997) , Blundell et al (2000) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) . All three papers …nd that, while Slutsky symmetry is rejected by the data, the collective conditions are not. These tests have been later extended to a general frameworks by Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2002a,b) . The conditions these contributions derive take the form of partial di¤erential equations that generalize the standard Slutsky conditions of the unitary model; speci…cally, they state that the Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank at most S 1, where S is the number of members. This property has been tested, and not rejected, on consumption data by Browning and Chiappori (1998) .
Alternatively, one can consider the test problem in the absence of price variation; then the approach must rely exclusively upon the e¤ect of income or distribution factors. This is typically the case for the standard cross-sectional analysis of consumption patterns, where it is assumed that individuals over the sample face identical prices. 3 In this context, a second family of tests can be used, that generalize the 'income pooling' family discussed above. Although simple versions of such tests have been used in various contexts (Bourguignon et al, 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Thomas et al., 1997) , no comprehensive theoretical analysis have been provided so far.
The …rst goal of the present paper is to investigate more carefully the theoretical properties of the empirical procedures used in the preceding papers. We …nd that they are surprisingly general and powerful. First, a simple general test of the Pareto e¢ ciency hypothesis is presented which is consistent with all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possible consumption externalities between household members, and all types of interdependent individual preferences and domestic production technology. 4 Moreover, the test is proved to be necessary and su¢ cient: if it is satis…ed, then it is always possible to interpret observed behavior as if it was stemming from a collective framework with well-chosen preferences. Second, a test is provided of some separability properties in the preceding framework which are equivalent to considering private goods and egotistic or 'caring'agents.
A second issue is the identi…cation problem: when and to what extent is it possible to recover the underlying structure -preferences and the decision process -from observed behavior? With price variations, an identi…cation result was …rst derived in the labor supply case by Chiappori (1992) , then extended by Blundell et al (2000) , Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2002b) . When only income and distribution factors vary, Browning et al (1994) have shown how it was possible, using a parametric approach, 3 The term 'cross-sectional'is slightly ambiguous in this context, since cross sectional analysis of labor supply often uses (possibly instrumented) wage di¤erences between agents as price variations. Throughout the paper, our interest is in demand analysis, and we identify crosssectional with the absence of price variation. 4 For a related work, see Dauphin and Fortin (2001) 4 to identify the intra-household allocation process under the Pareto e¢ ciency hypothesis when the consumption by one household member of at least one good is observed. The second purpose of the present paper is to extend these results. Speci…cally, we provide a complete analysis of the identi…cation problem; we show under which assumptions it is possible to identify, from the observation of the household consumption of private goods, the allocation of these goods within the household as well as the Engel curves of individual household members. The paper is organized around the preceding sequence of results. A …rst section describes the general structure of the model used to represent consumption decisions in a 2-person household. The following three sections are devoted to the three basic results above.
The basic framework
We consider a two adult household in which the two people are denoted A and B. We assume for the moment that there are n consumption goods and that they all are market goods which may be consumed either privately or publicly by the two agents. We thus denote q i 2 R n + the vector of private consumption of agent i (= A; B), and by Q 2 R n + the vector of public consumption. The household consumption vector of private goods (q A + q B ) is denoted by q, and that of total consumption (q + Q) by C. In line with the previous assumption, all prices are normalized to unity so that the budget constraint is:
where e is a vector of ones ( 2 R n + ), Here, x can be considered either as total income or, as in standard cross-sectional analysis of consumption patterns, as exogenous total household expenditure.
Each person has preferences represented by u A (q A ; q B ; Q; a) and u B (q A ; q B ; Q; a) respectively, where a is a vector of characteristics that a¤ects preferences directly. We refer to the a variables as preference factors. Thus a might include age, race, education of the two agents, number and age of children, etc.. We refer to this preference structure as 'altruistic preferences'because the private consumption of each member enters the preferences of the other. Note though that this might simply re ‡ect positive or negative consumption externalities rather than a true altruistic behavior. Also, this general formulation does not exclude the possibility that one person does not care about the other. In summary, no restriction is placed on preferences, beyond assuming that they can be represented by a utility function for each adult in the household.
Since individual preferences u A and u B generally di¤er we need to specify how households make decisions about what to buy; that is, how they choose q A , q B and Q, and thus C. We assume that the choices depend not only on total expenditure x and preference factors a but also on a set of distribution factors z, disjoint from a. Speci…cally: Assumption A1 : There exist a set of K variables z = (z 1 ; :::; z K ) such that:
: individual preferences are independent of z : the overall household budget constraint does not depend on z : the value of z does in ‡uence the decision process.
In other words, distribution factors are variables that a¤ect the choices of (q A ; q B ; Q) but do not enter directly the utility functions or the budget constraint. As discussed in the introduction, several examples of distribution factors can be found in the literature. Distribution factors will play a key role in the following for three reasons. First, the mere fact that they can in ‡uence behavior will contradict the traditional, unitary framework -as recognized by the numerous works mentioned above. Secondly, rational models which allow for an in ‡uence of distribution factors upon behavior, necessarily restrict the form taken by this in ‡uence. This will generate tests of that extended rationality, as it will become clear in the following. Finally, distribution factors are extremely helpful in recovering some features of the intra-household decision process, a point that will be emphasized in the last sections of the paper.
Notation. In the next section and a few other parts of the paper, the household demand for good i is denoted i (x; a; z) (i = 1; ::n). We use this notation when we do not want to distinguish between public goods (then i X i ), aggregate consumption of a private commodity (
). In particular, the general tests described in the next section are valid whatever the particular interpretation. We assume all demand functions to be continuously di¤erentiable.
In considering the restrictions implied by various assumptions below we have found it useful to use a novel type of 'conditional'demand function whereby the demand for one good is expressed as a function of the demand for another good as well as total expenditure and preference and distribution factors. Conditional demand functions are often used in demand analysis where we assume a single utility function. In that framework, the demand for one set of goods (the 'goods of interest') are conditioned on the price of these goods, total expenditures on these goods and the quantities of another set of goods (the 'conditioning goods'); see Browning and Meghir (1991) for further discussion. Another version of demands that are conditioned on another demand is the concept of an mdemand introduced in Browning (2003) . In this setting, one normal good is denoted the reference good. The demand curve for the reference good is then inverted to give total expenditure as a function of prices and the quantity of the reference good. This is then substituted into the Marshallian demands for other goods to give m-demands that depend on prices and the demand for the reference good. M-demands are useful in empirical modelling when we do not observe all quantities (and hence total expenditure is not observed) but we do observe all prices.
In the extended rational setting considered here, we de…ne a somewhat different type of conditional demand function that turns out to be useful. Consider 6 the demand for good j, C j = j (x; a; z). Assume that j is strictly monotone in one distribution factor at least (say, y 1 ). Then it can be inverted on this factor:
where z 1 is the vector of distribution factors without the …rst element. Now substitute this into the demand for good i:
Thus the demand for good i can be written as a function of total expenditure, preference factors, all distribution factors but the …rst and the demand for good j. To distinguish this conditioning from the more conventional conditional demands discussed above, we shall refer to them as z-conditional demands. Note that, in the unitary setting, there are no distribution factors, so that zconditional demands are not de…ned in this case. Finally, and unless otherwise stated, in the following we take good 1 as the conditioning good. In this case, we drop the (upper) index in the notation of z-conditional demand:
i (m; z; y 1 ; j ) for i = 2; :::n:
Various contributions apply the conditional demand approach developed here to collective models; the reader is referred in particular to Dauphin and Fortin (2001) and Donni (2000) .
3 Testing the unitary model and Pareto e¢ -ciency
The unitary model
In this section we investigate the restrictions imposed on the demand functions,
i (x; a; z), and their z-conditional counterparts, i (x; a; z 1 ; q 1 ), by the properties that one may be willing to assume about the intra-household decision process or its outcome. We shall essentially consider three hypotheses: the 'unitary'model; the 'collective'approach, as characterized by Pareto e¢ ciency of the allocation of goods; and an additional, bargaining-type condition. We begin with the unitary model, where we assume that a unique utility function is maximized. Formally : De…nition 1 Let (q A ; q B ; Q) be given, C 1 functions of (x; a; z). These are compatible with unitary rationality if there exists a utility function U (q A ; q B ; Q; a) such that, for every (x; a; z), the vector (q A ; q B ; Q) maximizes U subject to the budget constraint.
The restrictions implied by this framework are trivial. Indeed, it assumes that the household maximizes a single utility function, that represents the 'household preferences' in some sense. A consequence is that, by de…nition, the household demand functions should depend on total expenditure x and the preference factors a, but not on the distribution factors, z. Formally :
demand function is compatible with unitary rationality if and only if it satis…es:
@z k = 0 8i = 1; :::::; n; k = 1; :::::; K
This condition is an immediate generalization of the 'income pooling' hypothesis, which has been tested, for instance, by Schultz (1990) , Thomas (1990 An important remark is that a model with individual utility functions and a weighted sum of these as the household utility function is formally a unitary model so long as the weights do not depend on distribution factors. This fact has two consequences. First, the key insight of collective models is not that the household does not maximize some common index, but rather that this common index, if it exists, will in general depend directly on distribution factors (as well as prices and incomes). It is well known, for instance, that the Nash bargaining solution can be expressed as maximizing the product of individual surpluses. The crucial point, however, is that each agent's surplus (and therefore the index that is maximized by the household) cannot be seen as a 'household utility' in the unitary sense because it involves the agent's status quo point, which typically varies with prices, income and distribution factors.
A second and more surprising implication of this result is the following. Consider a model of collective decision making in which the household maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities, the weights being functions of household income but not of distribution factors. Although this model does not belong to the unitary class (since the index maximized by the household is incomedependent), it is observationally equivalent to a unitary setting, in the sense that any demand function (x; a; z) it generates could alternatively be generated by a unitary framework. This paradoxical conclusion is due to the speci…c nature of the problem, and more precisely to the absence of price variations. 5 This stresses the fact that on cross-sectional data without price variations, distribution factors are indispensable to distinguish between the unitary and the collective setting.
The collective approach
We now consider the more general framework, in which we explicitly recognize that the household consists of two members with potentially di¤erent preferences. Our only assumption, at this stage, is that the intra-household decision process, whatever its particular features, always leads to a Pareto e¢ cient outcome (PE). This hypothesis characterizes what we call 'collective rationality'. Let us state it formally : De…nition 3 Let (q A ; q B ; Q) be given, C 1 functions of (x; a; z). These are compatible with collective rationality if there exists two utility functions u A (q A ; q B ; Q; a) and u B (q A ; q B ; Q; a) such that, for every (x; a; z), the vector (q A ; q B ; Q) is Pareto-e¢ cient. That is, for any other bundle (q oA ; q oB ; Q o ) such that
for i = A; B (with at least one strict inequality), then
This de…nition is quite general since no assumption whatsoever is made upon the form of individual preferences, the public or private nature of consumption goods or particular features of the intra-household decision process (beyond e¢ ciency). Yet, strong restrictions on household demand functions obtain.
Our …rst crucial result is stated in the following Proposition, which provides a necessary and su¢ cient characterization of collective demand in the crosssectional context: Proposition 4 Consider a point P = (x; a; z) at which i (x; a; z) = i [x; a; (x; a; z)] 8i = 1; :::::; n (2)
ii) household demand functions satisfy:
; ::; n; j = 1; ::; n; k = 2; ::; K
iii) there exists at least one good j such that:
Proof. Let us …rst consider the case where there are at least two distribution factors, i.e. K > 1. From the Pareto-e¢ ciency assumption, demands should be solutions of the following program :
Here, the set of PE allocations is fully described when varies within R n + . The particular location of the solution on the Pareto frontier should of course be allowed to depend on all relevant parameters: i.e., will in general be a function of (x; a; z). Household demand functions can thus be written:
i (x; a; z) = i [x; a; (x; a; z)] 8i = 1; :::::; n as stated in condition (2) . Then (3) comes from the fact that:
Finally, in the neighborhood of any point where a z-conditional demand can be de…ned, (2) allows us to (locally) express as a function of q j , x and a. Replacing in the direct demand function for good i leads to (4) . Hence (2), (3) and (4) are equivalent necessary conditions for observed demand functions to be consistent with collective rationality. For su¢ ciency, note that according to (2) there exists some function (x; a; z) such that (x; a; z) can be expressed as a function (x; a; ) of x; a and alone. Take some arbitrary function G( 1 ; 2 ; :::; n ; a) that is positive, increasing and quasi-concave with respect to the variables 1 . De…ne then:
M (x; a; ) = G[ 1 (x; a; ); ::::; n (x; a; )]
We will now show that there exist two increasing and quasi-concave utility functions v A (Q; a) and v B (Q; a) such that the observed demand functions are solutions of (P) for (x; a; z) = M [x; a; (x; a; z)]. Clearly, these utility functions v i (X; z) are particular cases of the general utility functions u i () appearing in (P) because they depend only on public goods.
The necessary and su¢ cient …rst order conditions implied by (P) are:
where D v i is the gradient of v i and is an arbitrary scalar function of (x; a; z).
De…ne then:
where A, C are arbitrary increasing scalar functions and B is a scalar function de…ned by:
A is taken to be large enough with respect to B so that B is increasing. These functions A and B are thus increasing and quasi-concave. Moreover, it can easily be checked that they satisfy (A1). It follows that the solution of (P) with these functions i is the set of observed demand functions (x; a; z) which satisfy the equivalent conditions (2)- (4) in Proposition 2.
It remains to show that Proposition 2 remains valid in the case where there is only one distribution factor, i.e. K = 1. On one hand, condition (2) is trivially satis…ed since it corresponds to a mere change of variable of z, whereas conditions (3) and (4) become irrelevant. On the other hand, the above su¢ ciency argument in the case K > 1 remains valid when K = 1 since it is solely based on condition (2) . This shows that in the case of a single distribution factor and without a priori restrictions on individual preferences all observed demand functions are consistent with collective rationality.
When all consumptions are private, condition (3) has been known to be necessary for quite a long time. 6 Proposition 4 complement existing knowledge in three directions. First, it shows that the condition is necessary even in the most general case (entailing public consumption, externalities, etc.); second, it provides various equivalent versions of the conditions; third and more importantly, it shows that these conditions are also su¢ cient, in the sense that any demand function satisfying them is compatible with collective rationality.
How should Proposition 4 be interpreted? The basic idea is that, by definition, distribution factors do not in ‡uence the Pareto set. They may a¤ect consumption, but only through their e¤ect upon the location of the …nal outcome on the Pareto frontier -or, equivalently, upon the respective weighting of each member's utility that is implicit in this location. The key point is that this e¤ect is one-dimensional. This explains why restrictions appear only in the case where there are more than one distribution factors. Whatever the number of such factors, they can only in ‡uence consumption through a single, real-valued function . This is what is expressed by conditions i) and ii).
This simple idea has two important consequences. First, let us compute q i as a z 1 -conditional function of (x; a; q j ; z 1 ). Then collective rationality implies that it should not depend on z 1 . The reason is that, for given values of x and a, whenever distribution factors (z 1 ; z 1 ) contain some information that is relevant for intra-household allocation (hence for household behavior), this information, which is one-dimensional (as we have seen above), is fully summarized by the value of q j . Once we condition on q j , z 1 then becomes irrelevant. This is the meaning of condition iii).
A second, very important consequence relates to the question of the number of distribution factors to be taken into account. At the level of generality considered here, Proposition 4 says that at least two distribution factors are needed to test the hypothesis of collective rationality. Thus, in full generality, collective rationality imposes no restriction on household demand functions in the case where there is only one distribution factor. Now, this does not mean that no other restrictions can possibly be found, but rather that such restrictions require some additional assumptions to be made upon the form of individual preferences u i (q A ; q B ; Q; a), i = A; B. In particular, we shall see below that further restrictions appear in the case of a single distribution factor -and come in addition to those in Proposition 4 in the case of more than one distribution factor -when some goods are private and/or consumed exclusively by one member of the household.
Finally, two additional remarks should be made.
Remark 1
A and w B -do not, and can be taken as distribution factors. Hence Proposition 4 applies. In the present case, the partial derivatives in (3) and (4) may be interpreted as the household 'marginal propensity to consume' a given good with respect to the various components of household income. The unitary model would require that these propensities be equal for all goods. Through condition (3), collective rationality requires that these marginal propensities to consume must be proportional across all goods, whereas condition (4) requires them to be zero, conditionally on the demand for another good.
Remark 2 Proposition 4 generalizes easily to the Beckerian framework where domestic goods produced by the household are taken into account. Adding a domestic production function to go from the market inputs to the goods actually consumed by household members and taking into account the allocation of domestic labor do not modify the above tests on household demands for market goods.
Bargaining
Many papers that have analyzed intra-household decision processes have assumed a bargaining framework. If we take an axiomatic approach and include e¢ ciency as one of our axioms then necessarily the bargained outcome will satisfy the conditions in Proposition 4. Of course, the bargaining framework should be expected to impose additional restrictions. Although a general assessment of the extra testable restrictions that bargaining implies is a di¢ cult and still largely unsolved problem, an easy minimal test can be described as follows. Assume that some distribution factors are known to be positively correlated with member B's (resp. A's) threat point. Then, in program (P), should be increasing (resp. decreasing) in that distribution factor. But equation (5) provides an easy test of this property. Formally : Proposition 5 Assume that is known to be increasing in z 1 and decreasing in z 2 . Then the demand functions consistent with any bargaining model are such that:
::; n; j = 1; ::; n Thus if we assume a priori that two distribution factors have these properties then we have a further testable restriction. The obvious factors to take are the incomes of the two partners. Indeed, if we are willing to go further and assume that it is only the relative value of these incomes, z 1 =z 2 that matters then we have in addition:
This is simple to test and easy to interpret. As an illustration, Browning et al (1994) test the above restrictions on Canadian data, and …nd they are not rejected.
Examples
To round o¤ this section we present two parametric examples. To simplify the exposition we shall assume that there are no preference factors a and that there are exactly two distribution factors, z 1 and z 2 . We …rst model the unrestricted household demands as a quadratic in (x; z):
The restrictions implied by the unitary model are simply d i = e i = ::: = l i = 0. The restrictions implied by collective rationality -conditions (3) above -are a little more di¢ cult to determine. We can show that either one of the following proportionality relationships must hold:
2 + h:x:z 1 + k:x:z 2 + l:z 1 :z 2 ) (7a) or:
Thus, either all the terms involving the distribution factors z 1 and z 2 must be proportional across all demand functions, or all the demand functions must be quadratic in the same linear function (z 1 + z 2 ) of these factors. It is also easily shown that the z-conditional demands consistent with (7b) have the following expression under collective rationality:
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(where conditioning is made on q 1 ). If (7a) holds we have in addition that i = i = 0 . Note that in the absence of theoretical restrictions, z-conditional demands derived from the quadratic demand functions (6) would also involve terms in z 2 ; z 2 2 ; x:z 2 and q 1 :z 2 both in the …rst part of the RHS of (8) and under the square root sign.
As a second example, consider the case where the household demand function take the following extended Working-Leser form:
The associated z-conditional demand functions, conditioning on q 1 , are given by:
It is then easily shown that collective rationality implies that d i =e i be the same for all i=1,..,n, or, equivalently, that i = 0 for i = 2; ::n.
4 Private goods and caring agents: testing for collective rationality and recovering the sharing rule
The sharing rule
In the previous section we did not impose any restrictions on preferencesbeyond assuming them representable by a utility function -or on the public or private nature of the goods which are consumed. In this section we concentrate on the allocation of private goods across the members of the household. To do so, we impose the following restriction on individual preferences: i . These functions are a particular case of altruism. Following Becker (1981) we refer to these utility functions as caring. In comparison with the general formulation in the preceding sections, we see that this hypothesis is equivalent to some type of separability in the preferences of the two household members. Of course, caring utility functions include the special case of egotistic preferences for which
We concentrate here on private goods and we ignore the decision concerning public goods Q. One way to proceed would be to condition everywhere on public goods. For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to assume the following separability property between private goods and public goods in individual preferences:
Assumption A3 :
Also, from now on, x denotes total expenditure on private goods: x = e 0 (q A + q B ): It must be stressed that all the preceding assumptions make sense only if it is possible to distinguish a priori public and private goods. In that case, the consumption vectors q A and q B , on one hand, and the vector Q, on the other are de…ned on disjoint sets of goods. Such a requirement was not necessary in the preceding section.
We restrict our attention in this section to the case of a single distribution factor z. There is no loss of generality in doing so, since we have seen in Proposition 4 that collective rationality implies that various distribution factors a¤ect the intra-household allocation of goods through the one-dimensional factor . If demand functions satisfy conditions (2)- (4), the e¤ects of all distribution factors may be summarized into those of a single one. In this case, Proposition 4 has shown that collective rationality was not imposing any restriction to demand functions. Our objective in this section is precisely to show that this is not the case when one restricts individual preferences through assumptions A2 and A3 to the case of private goods and caring agents. Before doing so we introduce the fundamental notion of a sharing rule:
Proposition 6 (existence of a sharing rule) Let (q A ; q B ) be functions of (x; a; z) compatible with collective rationality. Assume, in addition, that the corresponding individual utilities satisfy Assumptions A2 and A3 above. Then there exists a function (x; a; z) such that q i is a solution to:
with i = A; B; x A = (x; a; z) and x B = x (x; a; z).
This proposition is a particular case of the general equivalence between a Pareto optimum and a decentralized equilibrium if there are no externalities or public goods. It thus requires no formal proof. The function (x; a; z), which denotes the part of total expenditure on private goods that person A receives is the 'sharing rule'. It describes the rule of budget sharing that the two agents implicitly apply among themselves when choosing a particular Pareto e¢ cient allocation. Of course, we are not assuming that households of caring agents explicitly use such a sharing rule. Proposition 6 simply states that the outcome of the household allocation process can be characterized in this way.
Collective rationality, private goods and caring: a …rst characterization
In the preceding section, we have shown that all demand functions (for public or private goods) were consistent with collective rationality if there was only one distribution factor. In this section we are restricting attention to the case of caring and separable preferences. The natural question arises of whether there are additional restrictions stemming from these hypotheses which would permit us to test collective rationality, in the case where observed demands depend on only one distribution factor, or which would come in addition of those included in Proposition 4 in the case of two or more distribution factors. The answer is positive. There are additional restrictions that must be satis…ed by joint demand functions in the case of private goods and collectively rational caring agents. These can be expressed at di¤erent levels of generality. At a basic level, the restriction is equivalent to taking explicitly into account the sharing rule either in direct, or in z-conditional demands. At a higher level of generality, we shall then see that it is in fact possible to recover the sharing rule between caring agents from the observation of their joint demand for private goods, provided these demands satisfy some restrictions. In turn these restrictions provide a general test of the joint hypothesis of collective rationality, private goods and caring agents.
The basic restrictions that must be satis…ed by joint demand functions is expressed in the following Lemma (preference factors a are dropped for convenience).
Lemma 7 Assume collective rationality, A2, A3. Then :
1. Direct demands must satisfy the following : there exists a real-valued function and 2.n real-valued functions i and i such that:
2. z-conditional demands must satisfy the following : there exist two realvalued functions F and G such that:
In (11a), i and i are A and B's respective demands for good i -i.e. their Engel curves; (11a) is restrictive because it must be ful…lled across goods for the same function . In (11b), t and s represent the total expenditures of A and B respectively, that is and (x ), and F and G are the demands for the conditioning good by A and B respectively. Again, the testable restriction in (11b) is that the functions F and G must be the same across all goods but the conditioning one. Note that this condition does not put any restriction on the individual demands for the conditioning good. An equivalent but more direct set of restrictions will be given in the next subsection.
Example Although the conditions given in (11a) and (11b) may appear somewhat involved, they are not too di¢ cult to work with for particular functional forms for i . As an illustration, we may consider again the case of Working-Leser demand equation (9) above:
As we have seen, collective rationality imposes i = 0, which is equivalent to the d i 's and e i 's being proportional across goods. Now, let us consider (11b). We have that
which gives :
i :(t + s):Log(t + s) = i :t:Log(t) + i :s:Log(s) This imposes that i = 0 for i > 1, so that the three sets of coe¢ cients c i ; d i and e i must now be proportional. Then direct demands become :
where
We now consider the identi…cation problem. In its more general version, the problem can be stated as follows: when is it possible to recover the underlying structure from observed behavior? Obviously, in the absence of price variations, individual preferences cannot be recovered. The 'structure'at stake here is the sharing rule and individual Engel curves; that is, we ask whether it is possible, from the observation of household aggregate demand, to identify the splitting of private consumption between members and the demand function of each member.
The identi…cation problem may be approached from a parametric or a non parametric perspective. In the parametric approach, a particular functional form is chosen for the structural model, and a reduced form for the demand function is derived. In particular, the derivation emphasizes the links between the parameters of the structural model and the coe¢ cient of the demand function that will be taken to data. Identi…cation, in this context, is equivalent to the uniqueness of the set of parameters of the structural models corresponding to any given speci…c values of the (estimated) coe¢ cients of the reduced form. Note that uniqueness, hence identi…cation, is conditional on the functional form; that is, it obtains (at best) within a speci…c and narrow set, de…ned by the functional form chosen at the outset. Nonparametric identi…cation obviously implies parametric identi…cation for any possible functional form. Conversely, however, it may be the case that parametric identi…cation obtains for a particular class of (possibly ‡exible) functional forms, whereas nonparametric identi…cation does not hold. This means simply that only one 'structure' (at most) is compatible with observed behavior within the class under consideration, whereas functionally di¤ erent preferences and sharing rules do generate the same demand function. It is important to note, in contrast, that our approach to the identi…-cation problem is explicitly nonparametric: we try to derive uniqueness within the general class of (smooth) demand functions.
The case of exclusive and assignable goods 4.3.1 A general statement
We start with two particular cases where some information is available about individual consumption of household members; then new tests and new ways of recovering the sharing rule may be found. While in principle rather speci…c, these cases are empirically very important; most existing empirical works rely on assumptions of this type.
We may, in some cases, observe how much of a particular good each person consumes; this good is then said to be 'assignable'. For instance, we may observe independently male and female clothing expenditures, or individual food consumptions. Alternatively, some goods may be consumed by one person only. This is the 'exclusive'case. One example would be information on the smoking or drinking patterns of one household member, provided that the same commodity is not consumed by the spouse -an idea reminiscent of Rothbarth's 'adult goods'assumption (see Deaton (1987) ). Note that, in the present cross-sectional framework, an assignable good is equivalent to a couple of exclusive goods, one being consumed by A and the other by B.
Before considering successively these two cases, we may stress their common feature: whenever one good is known to be exclusively consumed by one member -say, member A -this provides some information on the sharing rule, as described in the following Proposition: Proposition 8 (One exclusive good) Assume collective rationality and A2, A3. If the consumption of exactly one exclusive good (consumed by member A) is observed, and if the demand function of member A for this good is monotone, then we can recover the sharing rule (z; x) up to a transformation -i.e., if (z; x) is one solution, then any solution is of the form F [ (z; x)], where F is strictly monotone-without any restriction on the observed demand function.
Proof. >From (11a), an exclusive good consumed by member A is such that:
The function is thus some transformation of the observed demand function q(z; x). Note that if the implicit individual demand function is not (globally) monotone, then the result holds on any subset of income and distribution factors over which is monotone. In particular, the result holds locally almost everywhere.
The next step, of course, is to identify the transformation F . This is what is done in the remainder of this section . Notice, however, that, except in the case where all goods are assignable, and therefore the total (private) consumption of both members can be observed, the sharing rule can only be identi…ed up to an additive constant. In all the other cases, we can only observe how the sharing rule changes with total expenditure, x, and the distribution factor, z, but not total individual expenditures (see Chiappori (1992) for a precise statement).
The preceding proposition suggests that it is more convenient to use zconditional rather than direct demand functions wherever a good may be safely assumed to be exclusive. Indeed, conditioning on that good is equivalent to considering combinations of z and x such that the sharing rule is constant and should permit to identify easily the individual Engel curves for non-exclusive or non-assignable goods. This explains why many of the following propositions are expressed in terms of conditional demands.
The case of an assignable good
We begin with the simplest case, where we observe both members' respective consumptions of an assignable good (or, equivalently, of an exclusive good for member A and an exclusive good for member B). Then the following restrictions on the two observed demand functions must hold.
Proposition 9 (One assignable good) Assume collective rationality, A2 and A3. Assume in addition that good 1 is an exclusive good consumed by member A, and that good 2 is an exclusive good consumed by member B. Consider an open set on which the demand for good 2, conditional on that for good 1 is such that: i) there exists a function F(t) satisfying:
for all non-negative s and t ii) there exists two functions and g such that:
Proof.
(1) is directly obtained from (11b) and the exclusivity condition on good 2. (2a) expresses the fact that the demand for good 2 is that of member B and thus depends only on the share of private expenditure going to him/her. The function g (q 1 ) in that expression is the share going to member A and thus the inverse of his/her own demand function (as in proposition 9), which is in fact the function F( ) appearing in (1). Finally, (3) is a translation of (2a) into a partial di¤erential equation. Di¤erentiating (2a) with respect to x and q 1 yields:
and
Assuming that is non linear in x, we have that:
This must be a function of q 1 alone, which generates condition (3). Reciprocally, (4) implies that 2 ( ) is a transformation of a function that is additively separable in x and q 1 .
The preceding proposition provides a way of testing collective rationality, private goods and caring in the case where the consumption of an exclusive good is observed for each household member. The test is presented in terms of conditional demand. Transposing it to direct demand can be made by the change of variables (x; q 1 ) ! (x; z) based on the observation of the direct demand function for good 1, q 1 (x; z). Likewise, the sharing rule is easily recovered through that same change of variable. The function g(q 1 ) in the Proposition above is the share of private expenditures going to member A. This function is obtained, up to an additive constant, by integrating the di¤erential equation (4) above. Then replacing q 1 by its direct demand expression q 1 (x; z) yields the sharing rule:
It is also possible to use direct demand functions throughout, as shown in the following.
Proposition 10 (Recovering the sharing rule with one assignable good). Assume collective rationality, A2 and A3, and that q 1 and q 2 are consumed exclusively respectively by members A and B. Assume that the direct demand for both goods (as functions of x and z) are observed and that the corresponding conditional demand for good 2, 2 (x; q 1 ) ful…lls the conditions of proposition 10 . Then, the sharing rule is given, up to an additive constant, by the following equivalent di¤ erential equations: i)
Proof. Only a proof of (ii) is needed at this stage. From (11a) for exclusive goods we have:
Di¤erentiating the observed demand functions with respect to z and x yields:
Solving for x and z yields (6) . It may be shown that the condition under which that resolution is possible -i.e. 
-is equivalent to the conditional demand 2 (x; q 1 ) being well de…ned -i.e. @ 2 =@x 6 = 0 ; @ 2 =@q 6 = 0 -as in Proposition 8. It may also be shown that the integrability condition of (6), that is the cross-derivative restriction:
is equivalent to condition (3) above after a change of variables. Several remarks are in order. First, it is possible in the present case to recover not only the sharing rule, but also the Engel curves for each individual, up to an additive constant. Note that this identi…cation result still holds when, say, the preferences are identical for the two household members, or when they are linear. With an assignable good, it is therefore possible to identify the sharing rule, and the Engel curves, up to a constant with no restriction at all on preferences; as we will see later, this is not possible in the general case. Secondly, the identi…cation of the sharing rule and individual Engel curves can be performed using only the observed marginal propensities to consume out of the total budget and out of the distribution factor. In other words, identi…cation requires to use only the …rst derivatives of the observed demand functions and does not rely upon non-linearities. This is important, since identi…cation based upon non linearities is generally less robust.
The case of one exclusive good and one private good
A less demanding assumption is that one good only is known to be exclusive. This may be particularly adequate whenever the private nature of some consumption is debatable. For instance, Browning et al. (1994) assume that female clothing is indeed an exclusive consumption, whereas they allow for a public good component in male clothing. We thus consider a situation in which the (individual) consumption of an exclusive good and the aggregate consumption of a private non-assignable good are observed.
Restrictions implied by collective rationality turn out to be easier to express (and to test) in terms of z-conditional demands. Speci…cally, the demand for good 2 conditional on good 1 are summarized in the following.
Proposition 11 (One private and one exclusive good) Assume collective rationality, A2 and A3. Assume in addition that good 1 is an exclusive good consumed by member A, and that good 2 is a private joint consumption good. Consider an open set on which the z-conditional demand 2 (x; q 1 ) is such that @ i) there exists a function F(t) satisfying:
for all positive s and t.
ii) equivalently, there exist three functions ; and g such that:
iii) equivalently, 2 is such that
Proof. Proof. (i) is simply (11b). ii) is a restatement of (11a) where g (q 1 ) is the share of total expenditures going to member A, given that q 1 is exclusively consumed by him/her. Finally (9) is the partial di¤erential equation expression of (8a). The equivalent of relationship (4) above is obtained now by di¤erentiating (8a) twice:
which leads to (9) . Reciprocally (9) implies that 2x is the transformation of a function that is additively separable in x and q 1 . Hence (8a). As in the preceding case, the sharing rule may be easily recovered from the preceding di¤erential equation in x 1 and the direct demand function q 1 (x; z) through (x; z) = g[q 1 (x; z)]. As before, it is thus de…ned up to an additive constant. Things are a little more complex in the present case when one uses direct demand functions, although, as in the preceding case, all properties on conditional demands have their counterpart on direct demand functions. We leave these derivations to the interested reader.
The basic di¤erence between the present case and that of an assignable good is essentially that both the identi…cation of the sharing rule and the test for collective rationality, private goods and caring agents now rely on second (rather than …rst) derivatives of the observed demand functions. They may thus be less robust. For the same reason identi…cation now requires demand functions to be non-linear.
One could also consider other cases where more than a private good, or more than one or two exclusive goods would be observed. As in the general case, these additional observations do not give more information on the sharing rule, but they provide further tests of the joint hypothesis of collective rationality, private goods (and, possibly, exclusiveness of the goods assumed to be so).
Examples.
To illustrate the preceding properties consider the case where good 1 is exclusive and the observed demand for it is linear in x and z, and where the observed demand for good 2 is quadratic.
If only the demand for good 1 is observed then the sharing rule is of the type:
and identi…cation can only be obtained through an additional arbitrary restriction. If both goods 1 and 2 are observed, then it is possible to derive the conditional demand for good 2. It is also quadratic in x and q 1 :
If good 2 is exclusive to member B then condition (3) implies that B 2 = C = 0 and Proposition 2 yields:
and, after integration:
where k is some constant. The corresponding sharing rule thus is:
If good 2 corresponds to the joint consumption of both members, then Proposition 2 applies. Condition (9) does not impose any restriction because the conditional demand is quadratic on x and q 1 . The sharing rule is given by:
It is thus linear in x and z. Indeed, this is a particular case of the example analyzed in section 4 of a linear sharing rule consistent with two private goods and quadratic demand functions.
Estimation and test from joint demands : the general case
The previous results suggest that whenever information is available about individual consumptions, then it is in general possible to recover the sharing rule and individual Engel curves (up to an additive constant). We now show a much more surprising result -namely that, generically on preferences, identi…cation obtains even without information on private consumptions.
The general argument Let us start with a single consumption good. According to (11a), collective rationality implies that aggregate demand by the two household members is of the form:
This leads to the following partial derivatives:
where it is assumed that q i does indeed depend on z. Then from (11), we can compute and therefore an easier identi…cation than previously. This is actually the case, provided that demand functions satisfy some regularity conditions. Indeed, one can derive in that case two …rst order PDE, namely (14) and 
A result by Chiappori and Ekeland (2005) guarantees that, generically, (14) and (16) identify up to a constant and a permutation of members. Also, it is clear that recovering the sharing rule, up to a constant, implies at the same time recovering the individual Engel curves. Indeed, equations (12) give the individual marginal propensity to consume each good i as a function of z and x. Integrating these equations yield the individual curves up to a constant, and of course up to a permutation of the two individuals. It is clear, from the structure of the equations at stake, that identi…cation obtains up to a permutation of members: it is possible to say that one individual in the household is getting (z; x) and has associated Engel curves 1 ; 2 ; :::; but it is not possible to say whether that individual is A or B. In order to pin down this last issue, in the absence of assignable or exclusive commodities, a bargaining argument may be used. If the distribution factor is known to favor member A, then represents member A's allocation (instead of member B's) if and only if is increasing in z.
Needless to say, the determination of the sharing rule through (16) and of the individual Engel curves through (12) is extremely complex. We have not been able for instance to …nd analytical speci…cations of the aggregate demand functions which would permit to derive analytically the sharing rule. The simplest functional forms lead to rather intractable …rst-order di¤erential equations on . But, of course, solutions of these di¤erential equations can be worked out numerically. The important and remarkable result here is that collective rationality implies enough restrictions on aggregate household demand functions so as to recover the sharing rule and individual Engel curves from the observation of aggregate marginal propensities to consume and the way they change as a function of both total expenditures and the distribution factor.
Finally, identi…cation is only 'generic', in the sense that it relies on the non-linearities of the demand functions. Estimation and tests might then lack robustness. More precisely, the following proposition shows that the identi…ca-tion of the sharing rule and the test of collective rationality is not possible in the case of linear or 'quasi-linear'demand functions. 
ii) Conditional demands are linear : Then (11) is obviously ful…lled. Note that, in this case, the conditions of Proposition 5 do not apply. Also, it is interesting to note that all equations (12) are proportional, so that considering several consumption goods does not bring additional information. As we shall see in the next section [??], the only way to identify the sharing rule in that case is to observe an assignable good.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the properties of the 'collective' approach to household behavior. This only relies upon one general assumption : that decisions taken within a household are 'cooperative' or 'collectively rational', that is, lead to Pareto e¢ cient outcomes. What we have shown is that this very general setting has considerable empirical implications. It leads in particular to a sequence of tests which throw some light into the usual black box that is used to analyze the household consumption decisions. Remarkably enough, our techniques only require a distinction between those factors which may be behind the allocation process within the household -individual earnings in the …rst place, but not only them -and those that are likely to a¤ect personal preferences. It does not require in particular any knowledge of the actual intrahousehold allocation of goods. The most general test of cooperation does not even require any assumption on the nature of the goods that are consumed or produced within the household.
Additional tests are available when one wants to go further and infer from the joint spending behavior on private goods by the household some information on who gets what. A general test is available in the case where the analysis is restricted to private goods only. It has even been shown that it is possible, if that test is satis…ed, to recover from the observation of joint consumption behavior, information on the intra-household allocation of these goods and on individual preferences (Engel curves). More information and more restrictive tests may be obtained in the case where at least one individual consumption is observed. Whether those tests are robust and will actually provide more information on intra-household decision processes will be taken up in forthcoming empirical work.
